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philosophically engaging—even for the specialist or scholar—but also 
highly readable, writt en in a way that makes it accessible even to the be-
ginning student of philosophy. As commentator, moreover, Matt hews has 
a unique ability to both identify and draw out precisely those features 
of Augustine’s views which are (alternately) most puzzling, surprising, 
distinctive, or remarkable. He has a way not only of bringing Augustine’s 
philosophical ideas to life but also of calling att ention to their philosophi-
cal interest and relevance to contemporary concerns and discussions. In-
deed, one of the assets of the book is the way Matt hews brings Augus-
tine’s philosophical ideas into dialogue with more recent philosophical 
literature. Matt hews draws fruitful comparisons (and contrasts) between 
Augustine’s and Descartes’s views in philosophy of mind, he subjects Au-
gustine’s account of language acquisition and his treatment of the Prob-
lem of Other Minds to a number of Witt gensteinian critiques, he draws on 
McTaggart’s distinction between A-series and B-series terms in order to 
make sense of diﬀ erent strands in Augustine’s account of time, and puz-
zles over whether Augustine might be presupposing the KK principle in 
his account of self-knowledge—and these are but a few examples.
To be sure, there are inevitable costs associated with the kind of ap-
proach Matt hews pursues in the book. If you want an introduction that 
is both broad in scope and fairly systematic in coverage—a “big picture” 
framing of Augustine’s central doctrines and texts—then Matt hews’s book 
will likely disappoint. The book is, as I’ve indicated, topically organized 
and the choice in topics is not motivated—at least not principally—by a 
desire to provide exhaustive or systematic coverage of even those issues 
for which Augustine is best known. Thus, a number of more prominent 
elements in Augustine’s philosophy (his theory of illumination, his ac-
count of free will, his Platonism in metaphysics, to take a few examples) 
go unmentioned or fi gure only very minimally in Matt hews’s discussion, 
whereas some less central, or in any case lesser-known, topics are given 
considerable att ention (e.g., philosophical dream problems or puzzles 
about willing bad things). Not only this, but Matt hews rarely att empts to 
situate the particular topics he does consider vis-à-vis Augustine’s broader 
views in the same area (say, Augustine’s response to skepticism vis-à-vis 
his broader views in epistemology, Augustine’s account of lying vis-à-vis 
his account of virtues/vices generally, Augustine’s account of wanting bad 
things vis-à-vis his broader views about the nature of the will). Of course, 
none of this owes to any particular failing or oversight on Matt hews’s part; 
it’s simply to say that this book is not that kind of introduction.
Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Vir-
tue, by Jeanine Grenberg. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 269. 
Cloth $75.
PHILIP J. ROSSI, SJ, Marquett e University
Jeanine Grenberg’s carefully craft ed case in defense of humility as a central 
human virtue starts (Chapter 1) with an account of Kantian rational agency 
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in which dependency and corruption mark fundamental limits to human 
moral capacities. She then oﬀ ers a general picture of a Kantian theory of vir-
tue (Chapters 2 and 3) that is consonant with this construal of moral agency 
as dependent and corrupt. Grenberg notes that her Kantian based view 
involves at least one important contrast with Aristotelian theories—rather 
than understanding virtues primarily in terms of excellences, a “Kantian 
approach to virtue is . . . in part necessarily ameliorative” (p. 79)—but she 
also argues for important parallels. These include both a counterpart to Ar-
istotelian character traits, articulated in a Kantian understanding of virtues 
as principled, and a Kantian thesis on behalf of the unity of the virtues. 
Grenberg then oﬀ ers (Chapter 4) an analysis and response to recent ac-
counts of humility (e.g., by Stephen Hare, Norvin Richards, G. F. Scheuler, 
David Statman) to which her basic objection is that they “have generally 
rejected any appeal to human nature to ground the state [of humility]” and, 
in so doing, have turned to a “behavioristic defi nition of humility” that re-
lies “upon self-other comparison as a standard for self-evaluation” (p. 111). 
Her constructive account of “the Kantian virtue of humility” (Chapters 5, 
6, and 7) treats it as “that meta-att itude which constitutes the moral agent’s 
proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and 
dignifi ed rational agent” (p. 133). A principal concern in this account is to 
provide, through appeal to Kantian notions of interest, moral feeling, and 
respect, a plausible alternative to “the comparative-competitive model of 
humility.” In spelling out this alternative, Grenberg advances theses about 
the ways in which humility and a proper self-respect regarding one’s own 
moral agency mutually condition each other and argues, in addition, for 
taking moral exemplars to have a more important function for moral 
growth and education than is typically associated with Kant’s views. Gren-
berg then concludes her case by exploring (Chapters 8 and 9) “humility’s 
relation to the obligatory end of perfection of self” and “how humility is 
relevant to the obligatory end [i.e., benefi cence] relative to others” (p. 217). 
There are at least three levels on which Grenberg’s work provides bases 
for signifi cant engagement. First, it can be engaged as an exercise in vir-
tue ethics that, by its own enactment of a modestly advanced and gently 
persuasive case, not only brings humility back from the margins of discus-
sion, but also suggests that its restoration to a more central place in the life 
of the virtues is of considerable importance for truthfully undertaking the 
moral responsibilities we have to ourselves and to one another. Second, it 
can be engaged as an exercise in Kant interpretation that challenges once 
widely accepted views that placed an almost unbridgeable chasm between 
Kantian ethics as deontological and most forms of virtue ethics. Third, it 
can be engaged as an exercise in moral anthropology (or a moral ontology 
of human agency) which opens lines of potentially useful conversation 
with theological ethics and theological anthropology. A remark about the 
fi rst level will serve as introduction to comments about the other two; the 
pivotal point of engagement in all of these is Grenberg’s commitment, for 
which I am in full sympathy, to provide an “account of humility [that] will 
not abandon questions of human nature” (p. 111).
Both a sense of self-respect that is not keyed to comparison with oth-
ers and a mutually supportive relationship between self-respect and re-
spect for others are key elements in Grenberg’s construal of humility as 
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a Kantian virtue. She puts both points to eﬀ ective use in her necessar-
ily compact treatment (Chapters 8 and 9) of the two main divisions of 
what Kant terms “the duties of virtue,” viz., duties to oneself and duties 
to others. Her engagement with these points through illustrative use of 
Cordelia from King Lear and Alyosha from The Brother Karamazov shows 
great sensitivity to the complexity of the human social relationships in 
which humility needs to function. The latt er example—Alyosha’s abor-
tive att empt to make amends to Snegirev for the public insult infl icted 
on him by Alyosha’s brother Dmitri—takes cognizance of the fact that 
matt ers of social status and disparity of power distort both Alyosha’s 
and Snegirev’s reading of what the situation demands morally in terms 
of both their own self-respect and their respect for one another. Though 
both are eventually able to correct their prior distorted judgments (dis-
cussed in detail on pp. 243–50) so as to act toward each other in accord 
with the “humble benefi cence” of moral equals, Grenberg’s account does 
not raise the questions of whether or how humility in its Kantian guise 
provides any purchase from which a moral agent might address the 
structural social disparities that cloud proper recognition of one another 
as moral equals. My suspicion is that there may be useful resources in 
Grenberg’s construal of Kantian moral agency and in her mutual refer-
encing of self-respect and respect for others to the “untrumpable value 
of moral principles” (p. 161) that open possibilities for dealing with such 
structural issues. It may also be the case that both identifying and utiliz-
ing those resources will require addressing the larger issues that arise in 
bringing an ethics of virtue to bear upon the dynamics of shaping just 
structures for human society—issues that can be posed in Kantian terms 
as the task of exhibiting more explicitly what constitutes the unity of the 
moral demands articulated in a “doctrine of right” with those articu-
lated in a “doctrine of virtue” in an account of moral agency. 
This consideration about the mutual relation of self-respect and respect 
for others within the unity of human moral agency is relevant to the two 
other levels on which Grenberg’s work deserves thoughtful engagement. 
It is no longer surprising to see an interpretation of Kant’s ethics in which 
concepts once taken to be outside the scope of his intense focus on right, 
duty and the autonomous exercise of human freedom—e.g., teleology, 
character, and virtue—are reintroduced as important coordinates within 
his moral theory. Within the context of such “revisionist” readings of Kant’s 
ethics, Grenberg’s particular contribution does not lie simply in its eﬀ ort to 
provide a detailed case for taking Kant as both as an important point of 
reference for general discussions of virtue and as insightful expositor of the 
principles that inform a morally rich concept of humility. Of at least equal 
importance in my judgment is her aﬃ  rmation that an account of human 
agency that is conceptually and morally adequate needs to be referenced to 
an understanding of human nature that is not merely empirical and behav-
ioral. Grenberg’s interpretation is thus consonant with renewed interest a 
number of Kant interpreters have recently taken in the role that anthropol-
ogy plays in Kant’s critical project. It further suggests that any answer to 
the question of the unity of the “doctrine of right” and the “doctrine of 
virtue” will, of necessity, require an account of the human subject/agent as 
the locus in which the unity of fi nite, embodied reason is constituted.
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This brings us full circle back to Grenberg’s starting point in Kant’s 
account of fi nite human rational agency as dependent and corrupt that 
is given its most notable exposition in Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason. She articulates that account as “a general claim about the 
human condition: human beings are desiring and needy beings who tend 
in a whole variety of ways to value the self improperly relative to other 
objects of moral value” (p. 48). In a manner that is faithful to Kant’s own 
careful parsing of the diﬀ erences between the moral and the religious and 
between the philosophical and the theological, Grenberg tries to provide 
“a philosophically respectable, and not necessarily religious, account of 
a transcendent standard, and the limits of human nature in the face of 
it” as the context in which to make the case for the centrality of humility 
for a virtuous human life (p. 140). This careful eschewing of paths that 
lead to the theological—a move that allows aﬃ  rmation of a “secular (at 
times gentler), but always radical evil”—respects the a-theological (and 
even anti-theological) perspectives informing many of the interlocutors 
her work explicitly engages (p. 42). 
I hope, however, that this is does not become the end of Grenberg’s 
“story of dependence, corruption and virtue,” because there is reason to 
think that her work oﬀ ers something of value for the project of construct-
ing philosophical and theological anthropologies that can reckon with the 
fractured aft ermath of modernity. Grenberg makes a promising start in 
the direction of providing what Charles Taylor calls an “anthropology of 
situated freedom” (Sources of the Self, p. 515) in her depiction of “the chal-
lenge of the human condition” as “the task of learning to love the self 
well, that is to love the self in a way that does not undermine our equally 
inherent end of being moral” (p. 48). The theological crux here, of course, 
is the extent to which such a properly ordered love of self is only possible 
in view of fi rst being loved by God. 
The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity 
and Immutability, by Jay Wesley Richards. Downer’s Grove, Illinois: Inter-
Varsity Press, 2003. 267 pp. $26.00 (paper).
JEFFREY GREEN, University of Notre Dame
Jay W. Richards’s book The Untamed God is a creative and clearly writt en 
work that applies contemporary analytic metaphysics to the doctrines of 
divine immutability and divine simplicity. As part of his exploration of 
these two doctrines, Richards interacts with the work of Karl Barth and 
Charles Hartshorne.
In the fi rst chapter of the book Richards introduces classical theism and 
some of the logical diﬃ  culties the doctrine of God faces within this tra-
ditional framework. He begins by discussing the methods classical the-
ists use when developing accounts of God’s att ributes. Aft er reviewing 
both Aquinas’s doctrine of God and Protestant Scholasticism, Richards 
suggests that there is a tension in classical theism between biblical claims 
about God and the doctrine of God developed by Christian scholars. In 
